How Belal Muhammad Turned a Nightmare Matchup on its Head and Tossed Leon Edwards on His
Belal Muhammad re-tooled his gameplan and shocked the world in his rematch with Leon Edwards. I break down the pressure footwork, wrestling setups, and clinch tactics that saw him to victory.
The story of Belal Muhammad as a fighter is a story of discipline, preparedness, and persistance. He’s never been the best in any single phase, nor even at blending phases together. But few fighters in MMA take full advantage of their strengths and maximize their chances of victory through sound decision-making the way Muhammad does. His early UFC fights didn’t give off the air of a surefire contender, but Muhammad stuck around making incremental improvements, refining and adding tools while honing his in-fight instincts.
After his loss to Geoff Neal in 2019, Muhammad went on a ten fight unbeaten streak that finally lined him up for a title shot against Welterweight champion, Leon Edwards. But Muhammad’s early losses, as well as his performance against Edwards in their first No Contest, posed a big issue for his rematch with Edwards. Long-range southpaw kickers like Neal and Edwards have historically been a nightmare matchup for Muhammad, representing two of his three losses in MMA, and both of his unavenged losses.
I wrote before the fight about why Muhammad has such a hard time with southpaw kickers. To sum it up, his left-side dominant attack is more difficult to pull off given the stance matchup and the longer distance involved, and his right side is comparatively weak. Since Muhammad prefers to fight on the outside, he’s used to having the more effective long range weapons in his versatile jab and left kick. But against the southpaw kicker, those tools are hampered and the southpaw’s rear kick becomes the most effective long distance tool.
As Muhammad is outgunned at range, he ends up needing to close distance. I outlined Muhammad’s three main methods of closing distance against southpaws and explored how Edwards posed problems with those tactics, in particular how Muhammad’s habit of circling constantly outside the southpaw’s lead foot leaves them with a constant escape route back to kicking range. But my main critique was that Muhammad relies so much on discrete distance-closing tactics in the first place:
It’s a tough ask for a fighter like Muhammad who uses retreat as his primary mode of defense and isn’t super comfortable inside punching range, but I think his best shot against Edwards is to focus less on “closing distance” and more on not giving it up. Eat up space slowly, advancing methodically with his feet underneath him, and attempt to respond to the strikes without giving up large amounts of ground. Against a fighter like Edwards, especially as someone with a shorter critical distance, it’s often better to eat a jab or take a bit of sting off a rear hand by stepping or swaying back only slightly than to avoid it entirely by backtracking a mile.
Well Muhammad and his camp must have had similar thoughts, since he significantly re-tooled his process and fixed a lot of the issues that plagued him in his first fight with Edwards. He spent most of that fight conceding Edward’s preferred range, either closing distance in ineffective spurts before going back to the outside, or circling around the lead leg, allowing Edwards to retreat diagonally toward the open side and recover to a comfortable distance.
This time, Muhammad refused to let Edwards off so easily. He shot out intent on pressuring from the opening bell, but his pressure was as smart and measured as it was insistent. He advanced with shorts steps behind a flicking jab and a controlling lead hand covering Edwards’ own. Careful not to overextend onto counters, Muhammad opened up sparingly in open space, knowing his best opportunities would come once he manouvered Edwards toward the cage.
I previously pointed out Muhammad’s discomfort moving toward a southpaw’s open side, but here he stopped circling around the lead foot and instead prioritized occupying space in front of Edwards. He stepped down the middle with feints and probing jabs, forcing Edwards to deal with the ever present threat of an opponent right in front of him, right now.
By staying in front of Edwards rather than stepping around, Muhammad remained in position to track his movement and crowd him when he circled to the open side. Edwards was forced to decide whether to give ground, circle, or strike rather than being able to comfortably slide out the side door in reaction, and Muhammad would wait for him to pick one before punishing or tracking him. Muhammad also made effective use of herding strikes, cutting off his lateral movement with a rear body kick and left hook.
In terms of pressure footwork, it was a disciplined demonstration of the value of keeping one’s opponent straight in front of them at all times. But discipline and sound footwork was not all that it took to execute Muhammad’s gameplan. In fighting, mitigating risk is heavily dependent on the specifics of matchups and can at times be paradoxical. When faced with a thunderous puncher, the natural instinct is often to retreat and avoid the knockout blow. But for a certain type of fighter, the best way to maximize the chance of victory and avoid the knockout is to walk right into the weapon, daring the puncher to do his worst.
Leon Edwards is exactly the type of fighter whose flame is best extinguished by walking through it, not by running away or playing stick and move. When opponents retreat and circle, he picks them off from the outside and beats them with speed and efficiency. When they rush in, he plants his feet and smacks them with a counter. But when they chew up space methodically but unwavering, the cracks in his own composure and skillset start to show, as he starts retreating in straight lines and forgetting his lateral movement.